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Abstract:
UK Think-Tanks, the War on Terror and the Radicalisation Debate
Hadi Enayat

The paper will attempt to map the discursive and ideological habitus in which UK think-tanks
operate in connection with the ‘war on terror’. It will discuss how UK think-tanks have both
shaped and been shaped by this habitus and the impact their work has had on counterterrorism policy in the UK. It will begin by discussing the concept of think-tanks and their role
and input into politics. It will then sketch the rise of ‘terrorism’ as both an academic object of
study, from the mid-1970s onwards, and as an increasingly vital policy area for governments
and the military-security establishment, especially after 9/11. The paper will then focus on UK
think-tanks dividing them into three broad categories: conservative-orthodox think-tanks,
establishment think-tanks and alternative-radical think-tanks. Based on this small but
hopefully representative sample, it is argued that the think-tanks in the first category have
been the most influential in official UK counter-terrorism strategy. These are think-tanks
which have generally emphasised ideology—especially radical Islam—as the main driver of
terrorism and deradicalisation programmes like PREVENT as the antidote to this problem.
Think-tanks in the other two categories—which have emphasised other factors such as
grievances, networks and group dynamics—have been less influential in terms of public policy
although there is evidence that these factors have been taken more seriously by the UK
intelligence services if not always by successive UK governments. In discussing these issues, it
is hoped that this paper will form the foundation for a number of other forthcoming AKUISMC working papers on Islam, think-tanks and security in various European countries.
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UK Think-Tanks, the War on Terror and the
Radicalisation Debate
Hadi Enayat
Introduction
This paper will attempt to map the discursive and ideological habitus in which UK
think-tanks operate in connection with the ‘war on terror’. It will discuss how UK
think-tanks have both shaped and been shaped by this habitus and the impact their
work has had on counter-terrorism policy in the UK. It will begin by discussing the
concept of think-tanks and their role and input into politics. It will then sketch the rise
of ‘terrorism’ as both an academic object of study, from the mid-1970s onwards, and
as an increasingly vital policy area for governments and the military-security
establishment, especially after 9/11. The paper will then focus on UK think-tanks
dividing them into three broad categories: conservative-orthodox think-tanks,
establishment think-tanks and alternative-radical think-tanks. Based on this small but
hopefully representative sample, it is argued that the think-tanks in the first category
have been the most influential in official UK counter-terrorism strategy. These are
think-tanks which have generally emphasised ideology—especially radical Islam—as
the main driver of terrorism and deradicalisation programmes like PREVENT as the
antidote to this problem. Think-tanks in the other two categories—which have
emphasised other factors such as grievances, networks and group dynamics—have
been less influential in terms of public policy although there is evidence that these
factors have been taken more seriously by the UK intelligence services if not always by
successive UK governments. In discussing these issues, it is hoped that this paper will
form the foundation for a number of other forthcoming AKU-ISMC working papers on
Islam, think-tanks and security in various European countries.
1) What is a think-tank?
The term ‘think-tank’ was first coined in the US during the Second World War to refer
to a secure room or environment in which policy makers could meet to discuss wartime
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strategy.1 In the UK, think-tanks can be traced as far back as the early nineteenth
century with the establishment in 1831 of the Royal United Services Institute for
Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), considered in more detail further below, which
was founded by the Duke of Wellington.2 Today there are over 200 think-tanks in the
UK most of them small in terms of staff and with relatively moderate financial
resources. Think-tanks often want to influence policy, but have no formal political
power. Moreover, whilst they claim to be politically neutral they often make no secret
of their ideological positions.3 Think-tanks develop policies which are intended to be
considered by governments and opposition parties alike. They inform manifestos and
formulate ideas well outside of what the civil service are tasked with or political parties
have the time and resources to develop. They are also feeder organisations for state
institutions and their employees often move seamlessly back and forth between thinktanks and government positions.4
But as think-tanks have grown in number and become more diverse, scholars have
been unable to reach a consensus on exactly how to describe them. 5 Some think-tanks
are charities and others private limited companies. Some focus on very specific areas
such as defence or health while others cover a wide range of policies. This has led to
the construction of various typologies to account for the range of institutions that
populate the think-tank community. For example, according to Robert Weaver and
James McGann’s well known typology, most think-tanks are either of the ‘academic’
or ‘advocacy’ type.6 The former type is characterised by heavy reliance on academics

1 Abelson

(2014), p. 127.

2

Ibid., p. 135.

3

Hartwig Pautz, ‘Surprisingly, U.K. think tanks don’t often communicate with elected officials’,

Democratic Audit, 2014. Retrieved 10th September 2020:
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/57676/1/democraticaudit.comSurprisingly_UK_think_tanks_dont_often_communicate_with_elected_officials.pdf
4

Emma Burnell ‘Who funds you? Think-tanks are being tarnished by secretive right-wingers’, Politico,

5th

February 2019. Retrieved: 8th September 2020: https://www.politics.co.uk/comment-

analysis/2019/02/05/who-funds-you-think-tanks-are-all-being-tarnished-by-secreti
5

Pautz (2014), p. 346.

6

See Weaver and McGann (2002). Note that Weaver identified a third type which he called ‘contract

research organizations’ which are hired by government departments to carry out a very specific form
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and researchers and a stress on non-partisanship and objectivity. These more
‘academic’ think-tanks relieve their research fellows from teaching duties; in
exchange, they expect a certain public impact—columns, op-eds, talk-shows and bestsellers. The latter type identified by Weaver and McGann— ‘advocacy think-tanks’—
combine a strong ideological bent with explicit efforts to influence current policy
debates. Their output is less academic and often consists of synthesising and
repackaging existing ideas.7 In this more ideological form think-tanks are part of what
George Monbiot calls the ‘infrastructure of persuasion’ 8—the material structures of
ideology deployed by various political factions to try to gain hegemony over a polity or
discourse.9 The activity of think-tanks of this type may resemble that of pressure
groups employing expertise to achieve their aims. These ‘new partisan’ think-tanks
rose to prominence in the 1970s as the producers of a counter-discourse to the
Keynesian consensus.10 Indeed, during this period some of them were instrumental in
shifting the ‘Overton window’ of British politics to the right and facilitating the
establishment of a new neoliberal orthodoxy. These include the Centre for Policy
Studies, the Institute for Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute.11 The British
centre-left caught up with this development in the late 1980s with its own advocacy
think-tanks (such as the Institute for Public Policy Research and Demos). 12 At their
most influential then ‘advocacy’ think-tanks can frame, inform and elevate policy
debates, deploying their intellectual capital to affect policy outcomes.13 This process of
framing and shifting the parameters of a debate can be dramatic but the process itself

of often technocratic research and are mostly non-partisan (Pautz 2014, p. 347). This type of thinktank will not feature in this paper.
7 Pautz

(2014), op. cit.

8 George

Monbiot, ‘No 10 and the secretly funded lobby groups intent on undermining democracy’,

The Guardian, 1st September 2020. Retrieved 8th September 2020:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/01/no-10-lobby-groups-democracy-policyexchange
9

Sadeghi-Boroujerdi (2019), p. 21.

10 Stone
11 The

(1996), p. 17; Denham (1996).

term ‘Overton window’ was coined in the mid-1990s by Joseph Overton—at the time a

researcher for the US based think-tank, the Mackinak Centre for Public Policy—to refer to how the
acceptable range of ideas in a particular society shifts over time (Smith 2019, p. 149).
12

Pautz (2014), p. 347.

13 Drezner

(2017), p. 130.
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takes place in myriad small and subtle ways. As David Wearing puts it: ‘Assumptions
are established and boundaries set over a long period of time, across a wide range of
individual speeches and texts, by those who have the platform and the inclination to
do so’.14 At their best, a heterogeneous array of think-tanks can offer a contrarian voice
to a policy community that might be afflicted by groupthink—revealing its blind-spots
and offering alternative views. In this way, a think-tank can nurture disruptive ideas
that challenge the status quo and eventually become politically palatable.15
Fundraising is a major part of think-tank life. Researchers need to be paid and
overheads need to be covered. This money must be raised and generally that involves
finding sponsors for research projects, maintaining a stream of donations, and, in
some cases charging for membership.16 How does funding shape the output of thinktanks? Pressure to find funders can have a negative effect on the work of think-tanks,
though reputable organisations will generally not sell their skills to provide superficial
preordained research. Conversely, while funders of think-tanks are not usually doing
it purely for altruistic reasons, that does not necessarily mean they expect to benefit
directly from a think-tank they have supported. At the beginning of a contractual
relationship a creditable think-tank will generally negotiate what a patron can and
cannot expect for their money.17 But some think-tanks are more transparent than
others about their finances and recent reports about a secretive network of libertarian
and free market think-tanks deliberately hiding their funding sources has confirmed
all the worst stereotypes of think-tanks as essentially PR agencies for various elite
interests.18 In connection with funding and the constraints they place on think-tanks,
Tom Medvetz has argued that: ‘think tanks must carry out a delicate balancing act that
involves signalling their cognitive autonomy to a general audience while at the same
14

David Wearing, ‘Why is the BBC presenting RUSI as objective analysts of the Middle East?’, Open

Democracy, 11th June 2015. Retrieved 12th September 2020:
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ourbeeb/why-is-bbc-presenting-rusi-as-objective-analysts-ofmiddle-east/
15

Ibid.

16

Burnell op. cit.

17 Ibid.
18

Sarah Neville, ‘British think-tanks less transparent about sources of funding’, The Financial Times,

17th February 2015. Retrieved 11th September 2020: https://www.ft.com/content/ae6968c4-b5ec11e4-b58d-00144feab7de
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time signalling their heteronomy—or willingness to subordinate their production to
the demands of clients—to a more restricted audience’.19 He suggests that the
comparative advantage of think-tanks has been their ability and willingness to
genuflect to wealthy, powerful patrons and thus monopolise what he labels the
‘interstitial field’ between the academic world, the corporate sector and public policy.20
Indeed, think-tanks can be seen as a hybrid of an academic department and a law
firm.21 However, both think-tanks as institutions and the individual analysts they
employ must also cater to the demands of their clients more than even the most
conciliatory academics. Universities have large endowments and/or state-funding and
an additional revenue stream from tuition fees whereas think-tanks are much more
reliant upon benefactors and donors to finance themselves.22 Moreover, research at
think-tanks is often also geared to serving government, causing them to become more
deferential to the interests of state bureaucracies. This incentive structure suggests
that think-tanks pushing for a place at the policymaking table will be less critical of
powerful organisations than academics.23 But in the face of increased cuts across the
UK university sector, many individual scholars and departments actively seek out
government funding and cultivate relationships with policymakers as a way of
demonstrating their continued ‘relevance’.24 Meanwhile, policy elites often
categorically dismiss academic scholars as ‘irrelevant’ or ‘hostile’ to UK interests in the
Middle East. The consequences of excluding academic voices—particularly those
critical of US policies in the region—have sometimes been dire as we shall see.25
2) The rise of terrorism expertise
We will now turn to looking at the rise of ‘terrorism’ as an object of academic study—
one which has been significantly shaped by the think-tank community especially in the

19

Medvetz (2012), p. 18.

20

Ibid., p. 25.

21 Drezner
22 Ibid.,

(2017), p. 129.

p. 130.

23

Ibid.

24

Negar Razavi, ‘The Systematic Problem with Iran “Expertise” in Washington’, Jadalliya, 4th

September 2019. Retrieved 15th September 2020: https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/39946
25 Ibid.
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US. At the start of the 1970s there were few, if any, terrorism experts. Recalling the
state of affairs in terrorism studies at the beginning of the 1970s one expert wrote:
‘There really were no general experts in the analysis of terror, only those with special
academic skills (a knowledge of the Palestinian Fedayeen, or a career focused on
deviant behaviour) that could be related to the problem’.26 Moreover, before the 1970s
there was a consensus amongst national security officials that legitimate grievances
often underpinned political violence—then mainly referred to as ‘insurgency’. This
concept was largely underpinned by the notion that the way to stop political violence
was to remove its causes. For example, whilst using the word ‘terrorist’ a US
government memo from 1974 stated: ‘The US government recognizes the merits of
elimination of causes of terrorism, including legitimate grievances which motivate
potential terrorists’.27 Notably, in the 1950s and 1960s ‘terrorists’ were variously
referred to as ‘bandits, rebels, guerrillas, or later, urban revolutionaries or
insurgents’.28
This was to change over the course of the 1970s as expert discourse on bombings,
hijackings, ‘skyjackings’ and kidnappings shifted from a framework organised around
‘insurgency’ to one organised around ‘terrorism’, a shift that fundamentally
transformed the understanding of political violence.29 Lisa Stampnitzky identifies the
1972 Munich hostage crisis at the Olympics as a turning point in the shift toward use
of the term ‘terrorist’.30 The advent of the use of the concept ‘terrorist’ completely
altered the moral evaluation of these actors, who started to be seen as ‘pathological
evildoers’.31 Moreover, whereas ‘insurgents’ were generally assumed to be rational
actors, who could be countered with a similarly rational strategy of counterinsurgency
and sometimes negotiation, the rationality of ‘terrorists’, and thus the possibilities for
a rational and ‘reasonable’ treatment of the problem, would be constantly called into
question. Furthermore, while insurgencies were generally considered to stem from

26

Bell (1977) quoted in Stampnitzky (2013), p. 29.

27

US government memo ‘Guidelines for dealing with terrorism with international ramifications’, 1974.

Quoted in Stampnitzky (2013), p. 72.
28

Tucker (1997), p. 2 quoted in Stampnitzky (2013), p. 2.

29 Ditrych

(2014), p. 56. Stampnitzky (2013), p. 18.

30 Ditrych

(2014), p. 112. Stampnitzky (2013), p. 21.

31 Stampnitzky

(2013), p. 3.
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political motives, the question of whether terrorists even had political goals would
come to be highly contested, with terrorists often depicted as nihilistic ‘rebels without
a cause’. Thus, whilst the insurgency framework at least implied the possibility that
political violence might be resolved by addressing grievances and dialogue, the
terrorism framework tended to rule out such a possibility from consideration. 32
Finally, whereas previously it was acknowledged that there was such a thing as ‘state
terrorism’ by the late 1970s ‘terrorism’ was attributed largely to non-state actors.33
These discursive shifts were facilitated by a core group of terrorism scholars who
emerged in the late 1970s and informally referred to themselves as the ‘terrorism
mafia’.34 These included a number of key experts, some of whom remain influential
today, such as David Rapoport, Martha Crenshaw, Brian Jenkins and Paul Wilkinson,
Yonah Alexander, Walter Laqueur and Ariel Merari.35 As Jenkins would write in 1979,
‘there is a kind of informal, international network of scholars and government officials
with interests and responsibilities in the area of terrorism. A kind of “college without
a campus” has emerged’.36 The ‘mafia’ consisted of a core group at the centre of the
emerging terrorism studies world, who took on the project of making the field a
legitimate area of study. They organised events such as conferences and seminars,
places to publish such as journals and edited books and established institutions and
research centres. These projects both provided mediums of communication among
experts and aimed to establish the importance of the terrorism research project itself.
The process of developing an expert identity, and of building the collective project of
‘terrorism studies’ was thus intertwined with strategies to legitimate ‘terrorism’ as an
object of knowledge.37 Institutionally, this process found expression with the creation
of a terrorism programme at RAND (1972) headed by Brian Jenkins and funded by the
US government. This was part of the US’s new counter-terrorism apparatus that was
meant to ‘provide a broad understanding of the origins, theory, strategy and tactics of

32

Ibid., p. 51.

33 Ibid.,

p. 137.

34

Ibid., p. 39.

35

Miller and Mills (2009), p. 415.

36

Jenkins (1983) quoted in Stampnitzky (2013), p. 42.

37

Stampnitzky (2013), p. 43.
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modern terrorism’.38 As Ondrej Ditrych points out ‘RAND was a crucial institutional
site for the constitution of discursive practices of both power and knowledge in this
period since it was a major recipient of government funding and a privileged provider
of scientific expertise’.39
Despite this powerful and well-endowed institutional apparatus many terrorism
experts were often untenured and minor academic figures who stumbled somewhat
accidentally into the field from various other disciplines (psychology, criminology,
sociology, political science, law and medicine).40 Indeed, it has been a highly porous
discipline with people from adjacent disciplines often dipping in and out. As
Stampnitzky has observed, ‘rather than looking like a discipline or a closed “cultural
field” terrorism expertise is constructed and negotiated in an interstitial space between
academia, the state, and the media’.41 Consequently, despite the networked world of
the ‘terrorism mafia’, Stampnitzky argues that terrorism experts have struggled to
police their own subject, and many self-proclaimed experts have entered the fray.42 As
we shall see, Stampnizky’s analysis is in contrast to scholars working within ‘critical
terrorism studies’ (considered more below) who argue that the fact that many of these
experts were affiliated to right-wing think-tanks, the military, or the private security
sector has meant that they have become an influential ‘epistemic community’—a
network of ‘specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships
which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political values about the type
of policies to which they should be applied’.43
In the 1970s ‘terrorism’ was largely treated as a crime to be dealt with by international
law. This approach meant that international lawyers focused on particular crimes such
as ‘skyjacking’, kidnapping and bombing.44 But once these various crimes were
discursively synthesised into the broader category of ‘terrorism’ the legalistic approach

38 Quoted

in Ranstorp (2009), p. 20.

39 Ditrych

(2014), p. 112.

40

Stampnitzky (2013), p. 45.

41 Ibid.,

p. 149.

42

Ibid., p. 7.

43

Jackson et al (2007), p. 8.

44 Stampnitzky

(2013), p. 233.
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was undermined by the constant inability to define exactly what ‘terrorism’ meant. 45
Later, in the 1980s there was a shift from the criminal paradigm to treating terrorism
as a kind of war. This was accompanied by a new narrative that reframed terrorism as
a civilisational struggle, between ‘the free-democratic West’ and a network of terrorists
organised by the Soviet Union.46 This rendered legal and criminal approaches useless
and a military logic came to the fore. But, in contrast to the pre-emptive logic of the
‘war on terror’ that would arise after the 9/11 attacks, this first war on terror was driven
by logic of retaliation, in which military counterterrorism strikes were the equivalent
of punishment for a crime. This reframing of terrorism as ‘war’ was an explicit
technique of delegitimisation because ‘terrorism’ was defined as operating outside the
laws of war and thus illegitimate in both means and ends.47
With the end of the Cold War a new discourse emerged in order to characterise ‘Islamic
terrorism’. This new discourse would ultimately coalesce under the framework of the
‘new terrorism’. From this perspective religion is seen as the major cause of violence
in the contemporary world and the central feature which marks off the ‘old’ from the
‘new’ terrorism—the former based on secular ideology and thus more ‘rational’ and
amenable to compromise and the latter often seen as more dangerous because it is
religious and thus based on transcendental and absolutists claims. Thus, religion is
viewed as especially prone to violence because it is enormously effective in
accomplishing what Kierkegaard called ‘the religious suspension of the ethical’. 48 The
‘new terrorism’ discourse put forth the idea that terrorism in the 1990s was being
committed by a new type of terrorist who was prone to committing unprecedented
levels of violence due to their extreme irrationality. The tactic of suicide bombing in
particular was seen as emblematic of the nihilistic and irrational mindset of this form
of terrorism. Proponents of this view argued that religiously inspired terrorists are
determined to cause mass casualties among civilians, are driven to sacrifice
themselves in murderous suicide attacks and would be willing to employ weapons of
45 Ditrych
46 Ibid.,

(2014), p. 56

p. 7. The key text making this claim—widely read by counterterrorism officials—was Claire

Sterling (1981) The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism. New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston.
47

Ditrych (2014), p. 110.

48 Lincoln

(2006), p. 138.
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mass destruction. It is therefore a more murderous form of terrorism than the world
has seen before.49 Magnus Ranstorp, for example, argues that religious extremists are
‘relatively unconstrained in the lethality and the indiscriminate nature of violence
used’, because they lack ‘any moral constraints in the use of violence’. 50 Similarly,
Jessica Stern asserts that ‘Religious terrorist groups are more violent than their secular
counterparts and are probably more likely to use weapons of mass destruction’.51 There
is no possibility of negotiation, compromise or appeasement with these new brands of
terrorism; instead, eradication, deterrence and forceful counter-terrorism are the only
reasonable responses.52
There have been some dissenting voices to these views from within the ‘terrorism
mafia’. For example, Martha Crenshaw has questioned the distinction between the
‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism, arguing that it may be the structure rather than the content
of a particular ideology which is more important in pushing its adherents to commit
violent acts. Such structural features include utopian visions, a belief that
violence/terrorism is not only necessary but morally ‘right’, millenarianism,
dehumanisation of the enemy and the idea that the masses are suffering from ‘false
consciousness’. These features have been shared by both ‘secular’ (old) and ‘religious’
(new) terrorist organisations from right-wing nationalists and militant communists to
present day Jihadists.
But Crenshaw’s positions notwithstanding, terrorism experts were generally in
agreement about the nature of the ‘new terrorism’—particularly the threat of ‘Islamic
terrorism’.53 This discourse derived a great many of its core assumptions and
narratives from the long tradition of Orientalist scholarship on Islam and the Middle
East. This literature expanded in academia as well as in popular culture in response to
tumultuous events in the Middle East such as the 1972 Munich massacre, the 1979
American embassy hostage crisis in Iran, the Rushdie affair and the terrorist

49

Jackson (2007), p. 409.

50

Ranstorp (1996), p. 58.

51 Stern

(2000), p. 264.

52 Jackson

(2007), p. 409.

53 Crenshaw

(2011), pp. 52-66.
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kidnappings and hijackings of the 1980s.54 Even though it was challenged by an antiOrientalist discourse largely inspired by Edward Said’s book Orientalism (1978) it was
boosted by the 9/11 attacks and subsequent war on terrorism. Importantly, Samuel
Huntington's highly influential 1993 essay ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, the title of
which is derived from a much-cited article by Bernard Lewis entitled ‘The Roots of
Muslim Rage’ (1990), reproduced a number of Orientalist claims for an international
affairs audience and was therefore an important antecedent of the ‘Islamic terrorism’
discourse.55 Huntington’s thesis became an influential foreign policy paradigm even
though by 9/11 he had himself grown sceptical of it. Indeed, he rejected the notion that
the 9/11 attacks had confirmed his thesis, and encouraged realism and restraint. 56 If
he had claimed in his original article that Islam has ‘bloody borders’, he now
contended that Islam was not ‘any more violent than any other religion’. 57 But
ultimately it was Lewis’s more hawkish views that were to prevail after 9/11. Indeed,
unlike Huntington, Lewis disdained realism and argued that the US was no longer
facing a rational actor in which the logics of realism would apply. 58 Islam, Lewis
argued, had a chip on its shoulder ever since the Ottomans were defeated at the gates
of Vienna in 1683; after which it watched in humiliation as the West overtook it
‘militarily, economically and culturally’.59 In his post 9/11 bestseller What Went
Wrong? Lewis attributed the clash between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’ to the former’s
failure to modernise.60 ‘I have no doubt’ he told journalist Michael Hirsh, that
‘September 11 was the opening salvo of the final battle’.61 In an interview with the cable
satellite network C-SPAN, shortly after the twin-towers came down, Lewis claimed

54 Jackson

(2007), p. 399.

55 Huntington
56

(1993), Lewis (1990).

Ahmad (2014), p. 73.

57 Lewis

quoted in Michael Steinberger, ‘So, are civilizations at war?’, The Observer, 21st October 2001.

Retrieved 6th September 2020:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/21/afghanistan.religion2
58 Ahmad
59 Lewis

(2014), p. 73.

quoted in Peter Waldman, ‘A Historian’s Take on Islam Steers US in Terrorism Fight’, The

Wall Street Journal, 3rd February 2004. Retrieved 20th September 2020:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107576070484918411
60 Lewis
61

(2002).

Michael Hirsh, ‘Bernard Lewis Revisited’, Washington Monthly, 1st November 2004. Retrieved 20th

September 2020: https://washingtonmonthly.com/2004/11/01/bernard-lewis-revisited/
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that ‘the question people are asking is why they hate us. That’s the wrong question.’—
because for Lewis this hatred was ‘axiomatic’, ‘natural’ and ‘centuries old’. ‘The
question we should be asking’, he suggested, ‘is why they neither fear nor respect us?’62
A decisive show of American power was necessary to restore respect and where better
to start than at the heart of the Arab world in Iraq. Lewis’s ideas would assume
devastating significance after 9/11 when he would gain the ear of Vice President Dick
Cheney—one of the main architects of the Iraq war.63 As we shall see, they were also
to be a formative influence in the positions taken by the UK-based neoconservative
think-tank, the Henry Jackson Society.
In response to the rise of terror expertise a body of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS)
has emerged to critique existing research on terrorism and its political effects. Notable
practitioners working within CTS include Jeroen Gunning, Richard Jackson, Andrew
Silke and Arun Kundnani. In order to promote this current of scholarship a new
international, peer-reviewed academic journal called Critical Studies on Terrorism
was established and published by Routledge in 2007.64 Employing a Gramscian
perspective, CTS scholars have argued that ‘orthodox’ terrorism experts (such as the
‘terrorism mafia’) function as ‘organic intellectuals’ intimately connected—
institutionally, financially, politically and ideologically— with a state hegemonic
project.65 They have argued that there are a number of reasons why a critical turn
within terrorism studies is necessary. One reason concerns the dominance of statecentric, problem-solving approaches within terrorism studies and the close ideological
and organisational association of key researchers with state institutions— and the
concomitant problems of ‘embedded expertise’. Indeed, orthodox terrorism studies is
criticised for its overly prescriptive focus—a reflection of its theoretical and
institutional origins in counter-insurgency studies, as we have seen. An influential
review described much of the field’s early output as ‘counterinsurgency masquerading
as political science’.66 It is also argued that much of the scholarship in orthodox
terrorism studies has been somewhat superficial characterised by ahistoricity and
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heavy reliance on secondary sources replicating knowledge that by and large reinforces
the status quo. Thus, to quote O’Leary and Silke: ‘much of what is written about
terrorism … is written by people who have never met a terrorist, or have never actually
spent significant time on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict’.67 Scholars
working within CTS also challenge the distinction between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’
terrorism, outlined above, and widen their understanding of terrorism to include state
terrorism. Indeed, they highlight with concern the fact that, with only a few notable
exceptions, terrorism studies as a discipline has failed to engage with the issues and
practices of state terrorism,68 which, they argue, in terms of the scale of human
suffering and numbers of deaths caused, is a much more serious problem than nonstate terrorism.69 Moreover, it has been argued from within this literature that state
and non-state terrorism are co-constituted— sometimes directly through statesponsored terror and sometimes indirectly through violent interactions between state
and non-state actors.70 Finally, these scholars have tended to emphasise the political
grievances which, they argue, are a major driver of terrorism.
The work of CTS scholars has been an important antidote to the excesses of some of
the work produced in ‘orthodox’ terrorism studies. But there are also some pitfalls in
the CTS approach. Indeed, in a joint article three of the leading scholars in this
tradition have noted in a self-critical register that: ‘If emancipation is central to the
critical project, we would argue that CTS cannot remain policy-irrelevant without
belying its emancipatory commitment. It has to move beyond critique and
deconstruction

to

reconstruction

and

policy-relevance’.71

This

implies

the

responsibility to constructively engage with the challenges faced not only by targeted
communities such as Muslims but also with the challenges facing counterterrorism
officials with the responsibility for ensuring public security and safety. 72 Moreover,
CTS has sometimes overstated the stability and homogeneity of what they call
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‘orthodox terrorism studies’ which contains divergent voices not always as deferential
to elite interests—Martha Crenshaw’s work for example. As we shall see CTS has been
a distinct influence on the ‘alternative-radical’ think-tanks considered further below.
3) UK think-tanks and the war on terror
We will now turn to an analysis of UK think-tanks and their positions on various
aspects of the ‘war on terror’. The following discussion will look at a small sample of
some of the larger, well-endowed UK think-tanks (with the exception of Claystone
which is very small) categorising them using the designations: orthodox-conservative
think-tanks, establishment think-tanks and radical-alternative think-tanks. This has
been done because the issues surrounding the war on terror such as racism, Islam,
multiculturalism and the causes of ‘radicalisation’ do not map neatly on to the leftright spectrum in UK politics. Indeed, some of the publications considered below are
written by authors who are left wing in terms of their positions on anti-racism, antiimperialism and social justice but who have aligned themselves with Islamist-leaning
think-tanks which have taken very conservative positions on issues such as gender,
secularism and freedom of expression—Arun Kundnani (who has worked for
Claystone) for example. Conversely, other think-tanks have taken centre-left wing
positions on economic issues and harder-right positions on issues surrounding
immigration and multiculturalism such as the ‘post-liberal’ intellectual David
Goodhart—currently the director of Policy Exchange.73
A) Orthodox-conservative think-tanks
These are think-tanks which have generally hewn the most closely to what CTS
scholars refer to as ‘orthodox’ terrorism studies discussed above. Think-tanks in this
category include: The Quilliam Foundation, The Henry Jackson Society and Policy
Exchange. Whilst there are some divergent views within these think-tanks the
dominant narrative expounded by them is that the US and its allies are at war with
Islamism which is waging an essentially political war against ‘Western values’ or the
73 See
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Western ‘way of life’. In this narrative, ‘terrorists’ are irrational—motivated primarily
by religious dogmatism and hatred and thus implacable and unscrupulous.74 Thus,
given the nature and scale of the threat, the ‘terrorists’ must be met with aggressive
military action abroad and repressive policies at home. Moreover, they have tended to
subscribe, implicitly or explicitly, to the ‘conveyor belt’ theory of radicalisation: that
Islamist ideology mechanically pushes a person towards violent extremism. The
antidote to the totalitarian ideology of Islamism is ‘de-radicalisation’ programmes
such as PREVENT and the promotion of more liberal and spiritual forms of Islam.
These think-tanks also tend to be critical of multiculturalism as a set of policies which
has encouraged separatism and division and nurtured cultures which do not respect
‘British values’.
i) The Quilliam Foundation
The Quilliam Foundation was established in 2008 by Ed Hussein (author of the bestselling The Islamist published a year earlier) and Maajid Nawaz, both of whom had
been activists in Hizb ut-Tahrir before becoming disillusioned and eventually
becoming amongst the most prolific critics of Islamism in the UK. The foundation was
named after Abdullah William Quilliam (1856-1932), a solicitor from Liverpool who
converted to Islam and founded Britain's first mosque.
Whilst it has not explicitly endorsed the ‘conveyor belt’ theory of radicalisation
Quilliam has been foundational in legitimising the official narrative of radicalisation
and in implementing the PREVENT programme.75 For a while Hussein and Nawaz
regularly appeared in the media and on the conference circuit, arguing that political
issues such as the Iraq war were not all that important in explaining terrorist attacks

74

Miller & Mills (2009), p. 422.

75 As

one of four strands (Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare) of the UK government’s

counterterrorism strategy, PREVENT was originally introduced in 2003. It started on a small scale
but was expanded after the 7/7 bombings. But the increase in terror attacks over the next decade
prompted calls for expansion of the programme. After the murder of fusilier Lee Rigby outside an
army barracks in south-east London in 2013 there emerged a tougher approach to non-violent
extremism. New legislation required public officials working in schools, universities, hospitals and
local councils to report on individuals displaying signs of radicalisation (Cole 2009, p. 138).

18

in Britain. Rather, they said, the root problem was the ideology of Islamism, and the
best way to prevent terrorism was for states to create a Western Islam that was quietist
and devotional rather than activist and political. Speaking before a US Congress Select
Committee in 2008 Nawaz said:
There is a common misperception on the left in the U.K. whereby they
only speak about grievances as a cause for radicalization. Now, I had my
own grievances growing up in Essex. Many of my friends were attacked,
violently assaulted by racists. My friends have been stabbed before my
eyes, my white English friends, simply for associating with me. I have
been falsely arrested on a number of occasions and released with an
apology, and I have never been convicted of a criminal offense in any
country in the world. I had my own grievances. What makes somebody,
who has localized grievances, turn into somebody who identifies with a
global struggle in a country that has nothing to do with him?76
To answer this question Nawaz went on to argue that we have to understand the way
in which these grievances interact with Islamist ideology to generate a whole new set
of grievances, ‘which for an Islamist can be summarized in one sentence, and that is
that God's law does not exist on this earth’.77 In his statement to the committee Nawaz
stated that this ideology is made up of four elements which are shared by all Islamists
despite their differences in tactics: i) the notion of Islam as a comprehensive political
ideology, ii) the notion of sharia as a personal code that should be applied by the state,
iii) the notion of the umma as a global political rather than religious community and
iv) the desire to establish a global caliphate.78 From this perspective Nawaz argued
that terrorism cannot be explained by grievances alone and that ideology is a necessary
factor which acts as a lightning rod which channels and multiplies those grievances
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into terrorism.79 On this basis challenging the Islamist narrative became the priority
for Quilliam. The foundation launched a programme of radicalisation awareness
training among police officers, teachers, social workers and others and became one of
the main organisations responsible for implementing the UK government’s PREVENT
programme.80 In taking up this role Quilliam has faced sharp criticism from many
voices from within the UK Muslim community who have seen the programme as
discriminatory and counterproductive.81
ii) Policy Exchange
Policy Exchange (PX) has been described in The Daily Telegraph as ‘the largest, but
also the most influential think-tank on the right’82 and more recently in The Guardian
as ‘the lobby group that Boris Johnson uses the most’.83 It was created in 2002 by the
Conservative MPs Francis Maude, Archie Norman, and Nick Boles, who later also
became a Tory MP. A key figure in the formative years of PX was Michael Gove, a
founding chairman of PX and the current Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. After
the 2005 London bombings Gove published a book, Celsius 7/7, in which he defined
‘Islamism’ as an ideology that is similar to fascism and included Tariq Ramadan—the
reformist Islamic intellectual—as a follower. In the book he states that in the war
against ‘Islamism’, it will be necessary for Britain to carry out assassinations of

79 It

should be noted that, despite the emphasis on ideology, Nawaz has acknowledged the multiple

causes of terrorism—including grievances: ‘In fact I believe that four elements exist in all forms of
ideological recruitment: a grievance narrative, whether real or perceived; an identity crisis; a
charismatic recruiter and ideological dogma’ (Harris and Nawaz 2015, p. 36).
80 Faheed

Qurashi, ‘The Prevent strategy and the UK “war on terror”: embedding infrastructures of

surveillance in Muslim communities’, Palgrave Communications, 2018, 4:17. Retrieved 6th September
2020: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-017-0061-9
81 Hilary

Aked, ‘Questions for Quilliam: Counter-extremism and Islamophobia’, The New Arab, 25th

December 2015. Retrieved 7th September 2020:
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/12/25/questions-for-quilliam-counterextremism-and-islamophobia. Also see Nawaz Hanif, ‘Maajid Nawaz’s with-us or against-us mindset
is out of touch with reality’, The Guardian, 31st January 2014. Retrieved 7th September 2020:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/31/maajid-nawaz-lib-dem-quilliam-jesusmuhammad-islam
82 Pautz

(2013), p. 369.

83 Monbiot

op. cit.

20

terrorist suspects, in order to send ‘a vital signal of resolution’. More broadly, a
‘temporary curtailment of liberties’ will be needed to prevent Islamism from
destroying western civilisation.84 Gove’s views in this book displayed a distinctly neoconservative perspective which will be considered further below when discussing the
more radical right-wing think-tank the Henry Jackson Society—with which Gove is
also associated.
In January 2007, PX released a wide-ranging report on Muslims and multiculturalism,
entitled Living Apart Together.85 Munira Mirza, a co-author of the report, is now
working as head of Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s policy unit and was recently
appointed as head of a commission to look at race inequality in the UK. Billed as an
attempt to find ‘the reasons why there has been a significant rise in Islamic
fundamentalism

amongst

the

younger

generation’,

its

answer

was

that

multiculturalism and Britain’s failure to assert the superiority of its national values
had encouraged young Muslims to feel victimised and adopt anti-western views.86
Moreover the report argued that:
More generally, we need to revive a sense of direction, shared purpose
and confidence in British society. Islamism is only one expression of a
wider cultural problem of self-loathing and confusion in the West. One
way to tackle this is to bring to an end the institutional attacks on national
identity – the counterproductive cancellation of Christmas festivities, the
neurotic bans on displays of national symbols, and the sometimes crude
anti-Western bias of history lessons – which can create feelings of
defensiveness and resentment.87
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The report was released to the press on the day of a speech by David Cameron attacking
multiculturalism

and

Muslim

‘extremists’

who

seek

‘special

treatment’.88

Simultaneously, the conservative party also published a policy document suggesting
that such ‘separatism’ was encouraged by the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB).89
Later in the same year, PX published a report on ‘extremist literature’ which claimed
that ‘radical material’ was being distributed in a quarter of Britain’s mosques and
called for greater regulation and intervention in order to promote a ‘moderate Islam’.90
The credibility of the report was called into question by a BBC Newsnight investigation
which suggested that book receipts collected by PX researchers were faked. 91 In the
same year the then chairman of PX Charles Moore, a former editor of
The Telegraph and The Spectator, gave a speech outlining a ‘possible conservative
approach to the question of Islam in Britain’. In the speech he argued that the
government should maintain a list of non-violent extremists—Muslim organisations
which, while not actually inciting violence, ‘nevertheless advocate such anti-social
attitudes that they should not receive public money or official recognition’—in this
category would fall any groups with links to the Muslim Brotherhood or the Jamaatie-Islami (such as the Muslim Association of Britain and the aforementioned MCB), as
well as individuals such as Tariq Ramadan.92
PX has also defended the UK government’s PREVENT strategy arguing that the
Muslim anti-PREVENT lobby which has dominated public discourse is not
representative of the wider Muslim community in the UK. PX claims that these groups
have deliberately mischaracterised the strategy as a racist attack on Muslims.93 Indeed
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PX carried out a 2016 survey which, they argue, shows that Muslim communities are
generally relaxed about government intervention to tackle extremism.94
iii) The Henry Jackson Society
Founded in 2005, the Henry Jackson Society (HJS) is named after the interventionist
US Senator Henry Jackson (1912-1983), a Democrat with strong conservative
leanings. The HJS was launched online on 11 March 2005 and its current director is
Alan Mendoza. It is a registered charity in England and Wales and receives financial
backing from private donations and grant-making organisations which support its
work. Although they do not refer to themselves as ‘neoconservative’, the society is
steeped in neoconservative ideology largely articulated by US intellectuals such as
William and Irving Kristol, Michael Lind and Charles Krauthammer. The HJS’s
homepage originally displayed the following message:
The Henry Jackson Society is a non-profit organisation that seeks to
promote the following principles: that liberal democracy should be
spread across the world; that as the world’s most powerful democracies,
the United States and the European Union – under British leadership –
must shape the world more actively by intervention and example; that
such leadership requires political will, a commitment to universal human
rights and the maintenance of a strong military with global expeditionary
reach; and that too few of our leaders in Britain and the rest of Europe
today are ready to play a role in the world that matches our strength and
responsibilities.95
What is ‘neo-conservativism’? One of the leading intellectuals within this movement
in the US, the late Charles Krauthammer, contrasted it with three other approaches to
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foreign policy: ‘isolationism’, ‘liberal-internationalism’, and ‘realism’.96 The first
Krauthammer rejects for being ‘an ideology of fear’ because it promotes and reflects
‘fear of trade’, ‘immigrants’ and ‘the Other’. Furthermore, Krauthammer castigates
‘isolationists’ because they favour ‘pulling up the drawbridge to Fortress America’. The
problem with ‘liberal-internationalism’, according to Krauthammer, is that it stresses
‘multilateralism’, which in turn threatens ‘to blunt the pursuit of American national
interests by making them subordinate to a myriad of other interests’. Finally, ‘realism’
is rejected because it defines ‘interest’ in terms of ‘power’, and we ‘cannot live by power
alone’, for ‘America’s national interest’ is ‘an expression of values’.97 Indeed, in
contrast to realists, neoconservatives are radical idealists sometimes defining
themselves as ‘revolutionaries’. Despite Krauthammer’s nod to immigration neoconservativism in both its US and UK versions has been informed by a nativism deeply
antithetical to immigration, multiculturalism and Islam. This nativism is also often
combined with a strong dose of American exceptionalism especially the trope of
‘manifest destiny’—the idea that the US has a duty and mission to spread freedom and
democracy around the world. Thus, neoconservatives have advocated an aggressive
interventionist foreign policy as key to destroying international terror networks and
demonstrating a will to defeat terror through ‘shock and awe’—the demonstrative
effects of operations like the invasion of Iraq which would be a sanguine assertion of
Western military power.98 This draws from the ‘clash of civilizations’ framework
described earlier deriving from the work of Bernard Lewis who argued that Bin-Laden
and Saddam ultimately shared the same pathologies and that Arabs only understand
the language of force.99
One of the most prolific voices within the HJS is the current associate director Douglas
Murray a British author and political commentator. He is also a senior fellow at the
Gatestone Institute and a columnist for The Spectator. In his first book Neoconservativism: Why we need it (2005) Murray argued for the moral clarity of neoconservativism as the most potent ideological weapon against the existential threat of
‘Islamo-fascism’ and argued for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as benevolent
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interventions which (in his view at the time of writing) were bound to succeed
militarily. The real battleground, however, was one of ideas and here Murray argued
that the West has been hobbled by the scourge of multiculturalism which has
generated a crippling ‘dictatorship of relativism’ that gives the enemy a distinct
advantage:
The West is now swamped by this notion. In our domestic politics it is
epitomised by the nightmares of moral equivalence and political
correctness. It is also of course at the root of the barren and - as
thinkers as diverse as Fukuyama and Huntington have put it - innately
anti-Western creed of multiculturalism. It holds that all things are
equal which would of course be fine if they were: but they are not. The
good cannot be equated or judged equal to the bad, nor should the
sublime be levelled alongside, or tarred by, the ridiculous.100
A culture which is imbued with relativism, argues Murray, can in the end find no
reason to fight for its own salvation. Europe can only save itself, he asserts, if it
unambiguously stands up for its values and rediscovers absolutism in the defence
of these values. Armed with this philosophy Murray has consistently attacked
multiculturalism and what he calls in another book ‘Islamophilia’ a malady which,
Murray argues, afflicts metropolitan elites in the West who have treated Islam with
kid gloves with disastrous consequences.101 In a speech to the Dutch parliament in
2006 Murray asserted that in order to counteract the threat that Islam poses to the
West: ‘Conditions for Muslims in Europe must be made harder across the board:
Europe must look like a less attractive proposition’.102 Furthermore, he called for the
banning of ‘all immigration into Europe from Muslim countries’, and advocated that
European Muslims who ‘take part in, plot, assist or condone violence against the west
100 Douglas

Murray, ‘Neoconservatism: Why we need it’, A talk to the Manhattan Institute, 26 th

October 2005. Retrieved 20th September 2020:
http://www.socialaffairsunit.org.uk/blog/archives/000636.php
101 Murray
102

(2020).

Douglas Murray, ‘What are we to do about Islam?’, A speech to the Pim Fortuyn Memorial

Conference, 3rd March 2006. Retrieved 10th September 2020:
http://web.archive.org/web/20080201133647/http:/www.socialaffairsunit.org.uk/blog/archives/00
0809.php

25

must be forcibly deported to their place of origin’. During the speech, Murray called
for the extension of the ‘global war on terrorism’ to ‘Iran, Syria, and any regime which
sponsors or supports terrorism’.103 In a 2018 piece in the US neoconservative organ
The National Review Murray defended the far-right organisation the English Defence
League (EDL) describing it as ‘a street-protest movement in Britain whose aims could
probably best be summarised as ‘anti-Islamization’. In the same piece he called for the
release of EDL’s founder, Tommy Robinson who had been arrested in 2018 for
breaching the peace outside the court during an ongoing grooming trial.104
In light of concerns that they only appealed to the hard right of the conservative party
HJS tried to assert their bipartisanship. In order to appeal to a wider audience, the
epithet ‘neocon’ was dropped and an attempt was made to broaden their appeal
beyond the right wing of the political spectrum.105 This was done with reference to the
book Anti-Totalitarianism: The Left-Wing Case for a Neo-Conservative Foreign
Policy (2005) by Oliver Kamm (a founding signatory of the HJS). In this book Kamm
tries to place neo-conservativism in a wider tradition of left-wing anti-totalitarianism
appealing to the foreign policy outlooks of Clement Atlee and Ernest Bevin: ‘Indeed,
the neoconservative stance accords with the historic values of the democratic Left, and
neo-conservativism itself should be seen as a contemporary variant of traditional
liberal-internationalism (though one with less stress on the role of international
institutions)’.106 Moreover, he writes: ‘The terrorists of 9/11 were not making a
statement about poverty and oppression. Rather, they were acting out an ideological
imperative of striking at the institutions of Western civilisation: constitutional
government, international commerce and a civilian-controlled military’.107 Thus, for
Kamm the intervention in Iraq ‘was not strictly a “humanitarian war”: it was an “anti-
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totalitarian war”. It was a war in the cause of liberty.’108 In Kamm’s view of history the
issues around Saddam, Iran and the Middle East are analogous to those faced during
the Cold War — that opposition to totalitarianism implies the drive for regime change.
To secure the collective interests of the West, to deal with the threat of terrorist attack
and to defeat tyrannical regimes, you can and must impose from outside and above a
form of ‘democracy’.109 For Kamm, the Iraq experience vindicates this view, and he
saw the establishment of a fragile electoral democracy in Iraq as a vital achievement.
Indeed, despite the chaos in Iraq after the invasion, neoconservatives like Kamm,
Murray and others have continued to defend the legacy of the war by for example
arguing that the Arab Spring uprisings, starting in 2011, were largely inspired by the
downfall of Saddam and the establishment of electoral democracy in Iraq. This view
was most forcefully articulated by Christopher Hitchens whose journey from
revolutionary socialism to neo-conservativism echoed that of many of the founders of
the neoconservative movement in the US—described acerbically by Irving Kristol as
‘liberals mugged by reality’.110
B) Establishment think-tanks
These think-tanks are closer to the centre of the UK political spectrum than the
previous ones. These institutions are very much part of the establishment foreign
policy community. In this category are think-tanks such as Chatham House, Royal
United Services Institute, The Foreign Policy Centre and the International Institute
for Strategic Studies. Like the previous category we have considered, they have over
the years both drawn from and contributed to the central paradigms of ‘orthodox’
terrorism studies. In doing so, however, they have often accommodated a more
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divergent range of opinions than the conservative/orthodoxy discussed above.
Generally speaking, they have given cautious support to central aspects of the ‘war on
terror’ such as the invasion of Afghanistan while at the same time expressing criticism
of specific aspects of it—such as the Iraq war and sometimes PREVENT.

i) The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
As we have seen RUSI is the oldest think-tank in the UK. It came into existence in 1831
at the instigation of the Duke of Wellington, and was originally known as the Naval
and Military Library and Museum. Its mission according to its website is ‘to inform,
influence and enhance public debate on a safer and more stable world’.111 RUSI serves
as a source of quotes for journalists but also frequently provides content for the BBC
News website. Currently, its patron is the Queen, its President is the Duke of Kent, its
Senior Vice President is former CIA chief and US General David Petraeus and its
Chairman is the former British Defence Secretary Lord Hutton. Moreover, its
council includes an array of current and former politicians and military personnel.
Despite its description of itself as ‘independent’, therefore, RUSI is ‘very much a
creature of the British state and military establishment, without which it would neither
have been created nor would it exist in recognisable form today’.112
RUSI works closely with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at
Kings College London and especially its director, Peter Neumann, who is a senior
associate fellow at RUSI. Much of the work on terrorism in recent years at RUSI has
been produced by Rafaello Pantucci who rejects common explanations for the rise of
militant Islam among British youth, such as economic exclusion and the influence of
hard-line clerics. Moreover, whilst acknowledging its necessity, he has been critical of
the UK government’s PREVENT programme arguing that it may be exacerbating the
very threat it is seeking to prevent.113 In his work on terrorism, based on interviews,
conversations, briefings, court documents and published source, Pantucci
acknowledges the role of ideology but sees it as one of three inter-linked factors in
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understanding ‘radicalisation’: ideology, grievance, and mobilisation. According to
Pantucci, Jihadi ideology offers a way for young immigrants (or the children of
immigrants) to transcend their various ethnic identities. These youth are often
afflicted by an acute identity crisis—they do not feel British yet do not really feel that
they belong to any other country. Thus, the lure of the global umma as an alternative
and potentially liberating identity is highly seductive because fighting for an
internationalist cause offers an answer to the question, ‘Who am I?’ 114 This opens the
door for grievances: the more Western countries become involved militarily in the
Islamic world, particularly in ways that kill civilians, the more British Muslim youth
see defending their foreign coreligionists as a legitimate goal. The third factor is the
existence of a mobilising network of recruiters, today usually functioning online. In
the UK, these recruiters espouse violent versions of either Salafi or Qutbist ideologies.
Pantucci argues that behind the terrorist threat are complex social, religious and
political factors which have been ‘catalysed by the impact of an external ideology that
created a new form of Jihadist mini-movement in Britain’.115 Thus, whilst ideology is
a vital ingredient in the ‘radicalisation’ process it is a necessary but not sufficient
explanation for the turn to terrorist violence. As Pantucci relates:
Three main drivers have to be in place before individuals become
involved in terrorism: ideology, grievance and mobilisation. How they
coalesce is dictated by random events that are difficult to forecast much
as a fruit machine spinning in tandem and occasionally lining up is hard
to predict. The process is one predicated upon a series of contributory
factors, but there is no clear way of accurately measuring which one has
a greater impact than the others. All three drivers need to be in place in
order for some connection, however tenuous, to prompt an individual to
turn from a disenfranchised member into an adherent of a violent
cause.116
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Pantucci uses this fruit-machine analogy to suggest that while all three factors
(ideology, grievance and mobilisation) may be present in an individual they have to be
‘aligned’:
There is clearly a moment or an event that occurs in a person’s mind to
trigger the decision that terrorism is the path forward. This might take
the form of a specific event in an individual’s life or an external one (a
national foreign policy decision) which drives the individual or ‘bunch of
guys’, to quote Sageman, to conclude that something must be done. In
some cases, it is hard to distinguish mobilisation from the spark caused
by alignment: an individual (or group) might have other radicalising
elements present but it is actual contact with ‘real’ jihadis (those
individuals connected to Al-Qaida or affiliated groups) that spurs the
move from talk to action.117
In understanding ‘mobilisation’ Pantucci’s work draws heavily from the body of
terrorism research which has highlighted the importance of networks. The most
influential scholar working in this field is Marc Sageman who has argued that
participants in the global Jihadi movements are not atomised individuals but actors
linked to each other through complex webs of direct or mediated exchanges. Applying
Social Network Analysis to understand the nature and dynamics of these networks
Sageman argues that:
A group of people can be viewed as a network, a collection of nodes
connected through links. Some nodes are more popular and are attached
to more links, connecting them to other more isolated nodes. These more
connected nodes, called hubs, are important components of a terrorist
network. A few highly connected hubs dominate the architecture of the
global Salafi jihad.118
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The more connected a group is with others within the Jihadi movement, the more
connections it has established and the greater the likelihood it functions as a ‘hub’. The
more isolated a group remains, the fewer the links. Unlike hierarchical networks that
can be eliminated through decapitation of the leadership, a small-world network is
more durable because of its dense interconnectivity. Thus, a significant number of
nodes can be randomly removed without much impact on the integrity of the network.
Actions such as stopping individual terrorists arbitrarily at the borders will generally
not affect the network’s structure leaving it largely undisturbed. Crucially, Sageman
argues, it is the hubs of a small-world network that are particularly vulnerable to
targeted attack. If enough hubs are destroyed, the network breaks down into isolated,
non-communicating islands of nodes. Were Jihadi networks to sustain such damage,
they would be incapable of mounting sophisticated large-scale operations like the 9/11
attacks and would be reduced to small attacks by ‘lone-wolves’ or what Sageman refers
to as ‘singletons’.119 This picture of Islamic militancy as composed of nodes of personal
associations coalescing to form groups that are self-radicalising, self-sustaining and
self-motivating is at the heart of Pantucci’s understanding of the way in which
grievances can interact with an individual’s sense of imagined community. The
perception that others with whom one feels a common bond are being humiliated and
oppressed can be a powerful driver for action according to this view. It is in the
existence of a sense of community, whether that be a group of local friends or the
wider umma that he believes the roots of violence can be found.
These ideas about networks and group dynamics were not taken very seriously by
counter-terrorism officials immediately after 9/11 who were focusing on isolated
sleeper-cells implanted from overseas by al-Qaeda and waiting for the command from
Bin-Laden to attack.120 The idea that British-born Muslims themselves could be a
threat was barely imagined. But Operation Crevice in 2004 when a network of British
Muslims of Pakistani origin who were planning to blow up the Ministry of Sound
nightclub in London were arrested changed this attitude. Consequently, the
intelligence services became more attuned to the importance of networks in
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understanding ‘radicalisation’. This network had been to Pakistan for training but only
after they had radicalised. Moreover, there was no evidence that their radicalisation
was the result of brainwashing or recruitment by a militant preacher—they had
apparently self-radicalised within their own network.121
ii) Chatham House
Chatham House, also known as the Royal Institute of International Affairs, was
founded in 1920 and is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation based in London.
Its mission, according to its website, is to ‘analyse and promote the understanding of
major international issues and current affairs’. It is the originator of the famous
Chatham House Rule.122 Practically all Chatham House publications carry a disclaimer
to the effect that it is precluded by its Charter from advocating an institutional policy.
However, it seems clear from the Institute’s desire to attract government officials as
speakers as well as into its membership and round-table discussions that Chatham
House has maintained a close relationship with the policymaking process. 123
One of the most prolific scholars working at Chatham House is Toby Dodge, a
professor in the Department of International Relations at LSE and director of its
Kuwait Programme. An Iraq specialist with years of field-work in Iraq to his credit,
Dodge has been one of the most outspoken critics of the Iraq war from within the UK
think-tank community. In 2002 Dodge was one of ‘six wise men’ (him and five other
academics working on the Middle East) who met with Tony Blair and warned him of
the consequences of the decision to invade Iraq. The other five academics were George
Joffe, Lawrence Freeman, Michael Clarke (then director of RUSI), Charles Tripp and
Steven Simon. In an interview in The Independent Dodge recalls the meeting: ‘They
were expecting a short, sharp, easy campaign and that the Iraqis would be grateful’.
He warned of a possible disaster: that Iraqis would fight for their country against the
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invaders rather than just celebrate the fall of their leader. He warned that a long and
nasty civil war could follow. ‘My aim that day was to tell them as much as I could, so
that there would be no excuses and nobody saying, “I didn’t know”’.124 In an article
echoing these warnings published on the Chatham House website in 2002 Dodge
argued that: ‘Successful military action against Iraq will require large numbers of US
troops. The removal of Saddam Hussein, if possible, could cause greater regional
instability than his continued rule’.125 In 2010 Dodge argued, contra realist theories of
International Relations which emphasise power-maximalisation and interests as the
driving forces of foreign policy, that the Iraq invasion was highly ideological—an
attempt to apply what he called ‘kinetic neoliberalism’ to Iraq. According to Dodge:
‘Decision-makers are both empowered and constrained by the ideational categories
they have inherited from within their own societies and through which they make
sense of the world’.126 Dodge argues that the ‘ideational categories’ which ‘empowered
and constrained’ the architects of the Iraq war were a synthesis of neo-conservativism
and neoliberalism—what he refers to as ‘kinetic neoliberalism’:
The dominance of these major analytical categories—American
exceptionalism, the imminence of major international threats and
unilateralism from neo-conservatism; the universality of individual
liberty, the power of free markets and the threat of state power from neoliberalism—dominated George W. Bush’s policy responses to the attacks
of September 2001. Interestingly, after the State of the Union Address in
January 2002, in a series of major policy speeches through the build-up
to the invasion, culminating in the National Security Strategy in
September, neo-liberal tropes came to dominate policy towards Iraq. At
this stage neo-conservatism had little to say about how the domestic

124

Cole Moreton, ‘Iraq invasion 2003: The bloody warnings six wise men gave to Tony Blair as he

prepared to launch poorly planned campaign’, The Independent, 25th January 2015. Retrieved 5th
September 2020: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/iraq-invasion-2003-the-bloodywarnings-six-wise-men-gave-to-tony-blair-as-he-prepared-to-launch-10000839.html
125 Toby

Dodge, ‘Iraq and the Bush Doctrine. Storming the Desert’, Chatham House Website, 1 st April

2002. Retrieved 5th September 2020:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/archive/view/164647
126 Dodge

(2010), p. 1271.

33

structures of an errant state should be reformed; at a policy level, this left
prescriptions to be shaped by neo-liberalism.127
In 2013 Dodge wrote another piece, published on the Chatham House website,
arguing that regime change, far from bringing the neoliberal vision of democracy, free
markets and the rule of law to Iraq, had instead created a highly corrupt, kleptocratic
and sectarian state—the perfect conditions for the rise of ISIS.128 In another article,
co-written by Becca Wasser, Dodge highlighted the decision to dismantle the Iraqi
army by the US-led occupying force, combined with eight years of institutionalised
corruption and sectarianism—particularly in the newly constructed army—under
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, as particularly important in understanding the
collapse of the Iraqi state and the rise of ISIS in 2014.129
C) Alternative-radical think-tanks
These are think-tanks which challenge aspects of or completely reject the dominant
assumptions of orthodox terrorism studies. They are more closely aligned with the left
wing of British politics but also sometimes with Islamist groups in the UK. They
include Demos, Claystone, The Islamic Human Rights Commission, CAGE and
Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND). These think-tanks draw on some of
the themes in the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) literature discussed above. They
might question the existence of a coherent organisation called ‘al-Qaeda’ or suggest an
alternative understanding of the causes of ‘terrorism’ such as injustice, poverty or
racism. They might also seek to portray ‘terrorists’ as rational actors motivated by
political grievances and warn against aggressive military action or the curtailment of
civil liberties.130 They generally defend multiculturalism and emphasise racism and
Islamophobia as well as UK foreign policy as the main drivers of ‘radicalisation’ whilst
downplaying the importance of Islamist ideology. They are also highly critical of the
UK government’s PREVENT programme and sometimes call for its complete
dismantling.
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i)

Demos

Demos is a left-wing think tank based in the UK with a cross-party political viewpoint.
It was founded in 1993 by former Marxism Today editor Martin Jacques and Geoff
Mulgan who became its first director. It specialises in social policy, developing
evidence-based solutions in a range of areas—from education and skills to health and
housing. Demos is the only major think-tank that has attempted an alternative
approach to notions of Muslim extremism. Its research has sought to challenge the
conflation of Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.131 In July 2008, as part
of this research project, Demos decided to host a session at the Islam Expo in London
Olympia on the subject of ‘The Islamist Threat: myth or reality?’.132 In 2008 Demos
published a report entitled ‘Social Resilience and National Security—A British
perspective’ by Rachel Briggs which discussed the causes of radicalisation. It identified
socio-economic deprivation as one of the drivers of terrorism, but most importantly
identified grievance over Western foreign policy and the way criticism of such policies
has been restricted by the government as a major source of discontent:
The other key local factor for British Muslims is foreign policy, with many
highly opposed to the war in Iraq and policy towards Israel/Palestine. But
their fiercest anger is caused not so much by the detail of policy, but from
the government’s refusal to allow open discussion about it. In the
aftermath of the London bombings in 2005, the Home Office convened a
series of workshops with Muslim community leaders aimed at working
together to tackle violent extremism. There was enormous goodwill
towards the government immediately after the attacks, but this was
squandered when Ministers refused to include foreign policy on the
agenda. This silly own goal reinforced the community’s sense of
voicelessness, ironically at the very moment it had finally gained a seat at
the table.133
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The report also criticises the securitisation of Muslims in the UK arguing that it plays
‘straight into Al Qaida’s narrative of grievance and injustice as many Muslims began
to suffer under the new security regime’.134 Instead, it calls for a ‘community-based’
approach to counter-terrorism:
Community-based counter-terrorism is part of a much broader trend for
nonstate actors to play a greater role in national security. Governments
no longer have a monopoly on security. Since the treaty of Westphalia,
when the concept of the modern nation state was born, the prizes worth
fighting for have always been firmly within the gift of nation-states:
secrets, land, resources, people, and so on. But at the start of the 21 st
century, companies, non-governmental organisations and ordinary
citizens have important contributions to make, too. Security is no longer
something that governments can do to you or for you on your behalf; it
needs to be co-created by a much wider range of actors working in a
networked and interdependent way.135
The report argues that this approach is vital for four reasons. Firstly, communities are
essential sources of information and intelligence— ‘our own built-in early warning
system’.136 Secondly, communities picking up these signals are themselves best placed
to act pre-emptively to divert their young people from violent extremism: the selfpolicing society. Third, while the state must also play a role, communities must take
the lead in tackling problems that either create grievances or hinder their ability to
organise, such as poverty, poor educational and employment attainment, and the
paucity of effective leadership and representation.137 Finally, the police and security
service cannot act without the consent of communities they are there to protect.138 The
report claims that this ‘community-based’ approach had been adopted by the UK
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government and ‘now forms a central plank of the UK government’s own response’.139
Examples of this community-based approach are not discussed in the report, however,
nor is the PREVENT programme mentioned. It could be surmised, however, that one
example of this community-based approach was the process leading to the arrest of
the Jihadist preacher Abu Hamza in 2004. Hamza, an Egyptian cleric who had lost an
eye and a hand fighting in Afghanistan, became Imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque in
London in 1998. When his extremist beliefs became clear the board of trustees at the
mosque asked him to leave but he refused and turned the mosque into ‘the public face
of the extremist Jihadi movement in Britain’.140 Eventually, after evidence was found
of Hamza’s involvement with terrorism, he was arrested and eventually jailed in 2006,
a process which was undertaken with cooperation from the local Muslim community
and notably the Muslim Association of Britain who took over trusteeship of the
mosque.141 It is precisely this kind of dialogue and co-operation—especially with
Islamist-leaning organisations such as the Muslim Association of Britain that Quilliam
has criticised claiming that: ‘The ideology of non-violent Islamists is broadly the same
as that of violent Islamists; they disagree only on tactics’.142
The Demos report ends by discussing the problem of framing violent extremism as
‘radicalisation’ arguing that ‘radicalism’ can be a positive force and a source of social
resilience which can help young Muslims resist the lure of Jihadi terrorist preachers:
It is true that Islamism is growing in popularity amongst young Muslims,
largely because Islamist groups are the only ones willing to discuss the
political concerns of young people. But we must be careful to remember
that Islamism is not inherently violent and if these groups offer an outlet
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for frustrations they are perhaps part of the solution, rather than the
problem.143
This theme was reiterated in another report published by Demos in 2010 entitled:
‘The edge of violence: a radical approach to extremism’ which states:
The path into terrorism in the name of Islam is often described as a
process of radicalisation. But to be radical is not necessarily to be violent.
Violent radicals are clearly enemies of liberal democracies, but nonviolent radicals might sometimes be powerful allies.144
Note the distinction here with the approach of groups like Quilliam, PX and HJS who
have identified ‘non-violent radicalism’ as potentially dangerous and thus
legitimately the object of state scrutiny and securitisation.145
ii)

Claystone

Claystone is a small London-based think-tank specialising in Muslim issues. Its staff
regularly give interviews on the British Muslim TV channel 5 Pillars. Claystone
representatives have also given interviews to the BBC.146 It was very active in the mid2000s producing a number of reports which were highly critical of the PREVENT
programme. One of its most prolific researchers, Arun Kundnani, is an adjunct
professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches
terrorism studies at John Jay College. He has been a visiting fellow at Leiden
University, The Netherlands, an Open Society fellow, and the editor of the journal
Race and Class. Kundnani is the author of a well-received book on the war on terror
entitled The Muslims are Coming (2014) which draws from many of the themes of
Critical Terrorism Studies, discussed earlier, but also, as we shall see, from some of
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the ‘orthodox’ scholars in terrorism studies. In his book Kundnani rejects the idea that
ideology is the main driver of extremism:
Theories of radicalization that purport to describe why young Muslims
become terrorists are central to counterterrorism policies on both sides
of the Atlantic. But these make an unfounded assumption that ‘Islamist’
ideology is the root cause of terrorism. To do so enables a displacement
of the war on terror’s antagonisms on to the plane of Muslim culture.
Muslims become what Samuel Huntington described as the ‘ideal
enemy’, a group that is racially and culturally distinct and ideologically
hostile. The political scientist Mahmood Mamdani had earlier identified
such ‘culture talk’ as the default explanation of violence when proper
political analysis is neglected.147
In a report he wrote for Claystone in 2015 entitled ‘A decade lost: rethinking
radicalisation and extremism’ Kundnani amplifies many of the themes in his book
arguing that the term ‘radicalisation’ and its associated conceptual framework are
products of the post-9/11 period. Indeed, before then, scholars of terrorism did not use
the concept in their attempts to understand the causes of terrorism. Referencing the
work of one of the key members of the ‘terrorism mafia’ mentioned earlier (Martha
Crenshaw), Kundnani argues for a three-level account of the causes of terrorism,
involving: i) individual motivation and belief systems, ii) decision-making and strategy
within a terrorist movement, and iii) The wider political and social context with which
terrorist movements interact.148 Kundnani argues that today’s radicalisation models in
effect neglect the second and third of these levels and focus all their attention on the
individual level. Quoting the historian Mark Sedgwick, he calls for a critical
reconstruction of conventional radicalisation models:
The concept of radicalization emphasizes the individual and, to some
extent, the ideology and the group, and significantly deemphasizes the
wider circumstances—the ‘root causes’ that it became so difficult to talk
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about after 9/11, and that are still often not brought into analyses. So long
as the circumstances that produce Islamist radicals’ declared grievances
are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the Islamist radical will
often appear as a ‘rebel without a cause’.149
Kundnani criticises dominant narratives drawn from mainstream terrorism scholars
and what we have referred to in this paper as ‘conservative-orthodox’ think-tanks
which largely ignore the political context and the internal decision-making within an
insurgent social movement as largely irrelevant in explaining why terrorist violence
occurs. These theories imply that, once an individual has adopted an extremist
religious ideology, terrorism will result, irrespective of the political context or any
calculation on the part of an organisation or social movement. Castigating the
advocates of the ‘new terrorism’ paradigm, discussed earlier, he argues that the
intellectual tools used to analyse political violence in the past are no longer used by
terrorism experts with devastating consequences for counter-terrorism and for the
lives of many law-abiding Muslim citizens.
Based on this analysis Kundnani calls for an end to PREVENT policy since this
programme has made British citizens less safe by alienating Muslims and making the
Jihadi narrative more appealing.150 He also advises that information about risks of
radicalisation should be shared with authorities only once it crosses the line to
incitement to violence, financing of terrorism or an intention to commit acts of
violence.151 According to Kundnani: ‘The significant government resources that have
been made available to bring about a broader ideological transformation among
British Muslims are more productively redirected to this purpose’. 152 Moreover,
governments should ‘publicly defend freedom of religion, even for individuals who
choose to adopt religious beliefs deemed extremist’.153 Indeed, Kundnani argues that
deradicalisation programmes violate the principle of secularism because the state is

149

Sedgwick quoted in Kundnani (2015), p. 14.

150

Kundnani (2015), p. 3.

151

Ibid., p. 37.

152

Ibid., p. 38.

153 Ibid.

40

effectively endorsing an official version of Islam deemed compatible with liberalism.154
The UK government should publicly acknowledge that foreign policy decisions are a
significant factor in creating political contexts within which terrorism becomes more
or less likely. Finally, Kundnani calls for the creation of ‘safe-spaces’ for wide-ranging
discussions of religious ideology, identity and foreign policy, particularly among young
people who feel excluded from mainstream politics.155 Those spaces should not be
undercut by the fear that expressions of radical views will attract the attention of
intelligence agencies and police counter-terrorism units.156
4) Conclusion
How has the UK think-tank community influenced counter-terrorism policy? After
9/11 neoconservative think-tanks like the Henry Jackson Society dominated the
discourse on the causes of terrorism and the appropriate response to them on both
sides of the Atlantic. For the neoconservatives, who dominated US policy-making on
counter-terrorism in the early years of the ‘war on terror’ terrorism was seen as a
product of ‘Islamic culture’.157 As we have seen, scholars like Bernard Lewis, a key
advisor on the Middle East to the George W. Bush administration, argued that Islam
had a cultural propensity towards totalitarian rejections of modernity. This antimodernism ran so deep in the culture of the Middle East that only war could overturn
it and inaugurate a cultural and political transformation of the region. Tony Blair
apparently accepted much of this neoconservative analysis and his support for the
2003 war on Iraq rested—partly at least—on this basis.158 By 2005, when the
disastrous consequences of the Iraq war had become apparent, counter-terrorism
policy-makers were looking for new theories that could help them understand how to
prevent bombings carried out by European citizens, such as those that took place in
Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005.159 At this point, the concept of ‘radicalisation’
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became central to the emerging models of the causes of terrorism in national security
circles.
Broadly speaking this debate has been divided into two camps: ‘idealists’ and
‘materialists’. The former—represented by think-tanks like Quilliam, PX and HJS have
emphasised ideology in the form of radical Islam as the key to understanding
radicalisation. In addition, as we have seen, they sometimes emphasised the divisive
effects of multiculturalism and the lack of adherence to ‘British values’ as encouraging
terrorism. The latter camp, represented more by think-tanks like RUSI, Demos and
Claystone, have emphasised ‘material’ factors, like political grievance (mainly foreign
policy and racism), social-networks and group dynamics more than ideologicalreligious factors. Addressing some of these grievances as well as understanding the
dynamics of these networks was seen as key to countering terrorism. As we have seen,
these are not mutually exclusive camps and some voices such as Pantucci and
Crenshaw have argued for a holistic multi-casual explanation for the turn to violent
extremism which incorporates both ideological and material factors. Indeed, it is
impossible to disentangle ‘material’ factors such as war or racism from ‘ideological’
factors such as discourse, religion and narrative. The former are, partly at least,
constituted by the latter: whilst material ‘events’ and ‘experiences’ clearly have
autonomy from their ideological and discursive articulations, they are at the same time
interpreted and given meaning through such frameworks. Jihadist ideology, for
example, promotes a powerful ‘narrative of blame’—that the ‘West’, led by the US, is
engaged in a vast joined-up conspiracy to destroy ‘Islam’.160 This narrative—itself a
synthesis of a brutally literalist and ahistorical reading of the foundational Islamic
texts synthesised with ‘Occidentalist’ political propaganda—is twisted and largely
divorced from reality.161 Nevertheless, as Stephen Holmes argues, any sensible
response to 9/11 should have aimed at unravelling and weakening the credibility of
such a narrative. Instead, by invading Iraq, the US and its allies ‘corroborated a central
proposition in the Jihadist narrative of blame, namely, that Americans feel contempt
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for Muslims and ascribe little or no value to Muslim lives’.162 The Trump Presidency
and its racist language and policies towards Muslims has also strengthened this kind
of narrative as have, arguably, programmes like PREVENT.
In terms of influencing government policy, the ‘idealists’ have largely won out in this
debate and the public face of UK counter-terrorism policy continues to be the
controversial PREVENT programme. Indeed, successive governments have
consistently denied the causal links between UK foreign policy and radicalisation.
There are some indications, however, that the intelligence services in the UK have
acknowledged the role of political grievances in exacerbating the threat of
international terrorism. For example, Stella Rimington, former head of MI5, in an
interview with The Guardian in 2008 was asked about the effect of Britain’s invasion
of Iraq on the terrorist threat to Britain:
Look at what those people who've been arrested or have left suicide
videos say about their motivation. And most of them, as far as I'm
aware, say that the war in Iraq played a significant part in persuading
them that this is the right course of action to take. So, I think you can't
write the war in Iraq out of history. If what we're looking at is groups
of disaffected young men born in this country who turn to terrorism,
then I think to ignore the effect of the war in Iraq is misleading.163
According to Rimington these views were widely held among the intelligence services
and there is evidence that this was the official view of MI5. For example, the Director
General of the Security Service, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, underlined this
position in a speech in 2006. Whilst emphasising that the terrorist threat existed
before 9/11 Manningham-Buller acknowledged the role of political grievances in
exacerbating the threat:
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The extremists are motivated by a sense of grievance and injustice driven
by their interpretation of the history between the West and the Muslim
world … This is a powerful narrative that weaves together conflicts from
across the globe, presenting the West's response to varied and complex
issues, from long-standing disputes such as Israel/Palestine and Kashmir
to more recent events as evidence of an across-the-board determination
to undermine and humiliate Islam worldwide. Afghanistan, the Balkans,
Chechnya, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Kashmir and Lebanon are regularly
cited by those who advocate terrorist violence as illustrating what they
allege is Western hostility to Islam.164
Indeed, we have seen, think-tanks such as RUSI which are close to the militarysecurity establishment in the UK also identify ‘grievance’ as one of the factors driving
terrorism along with ideology and the dynamics of networks and group-dynamics in
facilitating ‘self-radicalisation’. It is hoped that the forthcoming papers in this series
will throw more light on these debates from perspectives outside of the UK as well as
on the efficacy of alternative ‘deradicalisation’ models which have been less divisive
than the UK’s PREVENT programme.
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